Your FBI: Counterintelligence - Cuba: The Neighborhood Spy

  The small island nation of Cuba sits 90 miles from the United States, utilizing effective counterintelligence strategies to thwart American assets. #YourFBI Counterintelligence and Espionage Division shares how they are safeguarding our nation’s secrets, crushing threats, and stopping weapons from falling into the wrong hands in this roundtable discussion. Learn more and watch the full discussion:

https://youtu.be/aGiAloQevMs?si=WXPb6b1X_RKuoMBi

" Comandante Manuel Pineiro - member of the CC of the CCP and head of the State Security service, before my departure from Havana on May 21st there was a demand for accepting 30 Cuban comrades for training in sabotage and contra revolutionary activity"

 

Cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republic Cuba /Bulgarian Intelligence & Security Services in the Cold War

Cold War Research Group-Bulgaria
Coordinator: Dr. Jordan Baev
e-mail: baevj@mail.orbitel.bg

                                                                                                                       CC BCP

Secretariat Secret Resolution re: Training Cuban security officers in Bulgaria, 8 June 1966 [Source: CDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 64, File 352] RESOLUTION "B" No 8 Of The Secretariat of The Central Committee of The Bulgarian Communist Party from June 8th 1966. The CC BCP Secretariat approves the proposal Comrade Pineiro to visit our country. We can accept 30 people for training only on counterintelligence work. We have no conditions to train people on sabotage.1 Top Secret [Translated by Kalina Bratanova] 1 Handwritten resolution by Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary CC BCP and Prime Minister of PR of Bulgaria .

 TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC BCP COMRADE LUCHEZAR AVRAMOV Comrade Avramov, At a meeting with Comandante Sergio Del Valle – Politburo member of the Cuban Communist Party, captain Osmani Cienfuegos – head of the Foreign Affairs Commission at the CC of the CCP and Secretary General of the Tricontinental Committee and Comandante Manuel Pineiro - member of the CC of the CCP and head of the State Security service, before my departure from Havana on May 21st there was a demand for accepting 30 Cuban comrades for training in sabotage and contra revolutionary activity. They consider the training period to be about a year and the training itself should be at our expense. They expect to receive an to our country to coordinate the details. I answered I would report the issue to the respective people and they would be informed answer in principle not later than June 5th or 6th this year. They can send Comandante Pineiro bout the result. I would like to ask you for your instructions. June 4th 1966 Sofia [Gen. Angel Solakov, Chairman of the State Security Committee]  Ministry of the Interior. Sofia, Fond 1, Record 10a, File 561). 
  
"We have sent information to MVR-Cuba concerning a completed case, information and materials on the operational-investigating work, the organization, structure and activities of VAI - Ministry of Defense."(1). Trad. Greta Keremidchieva).   AMVR Fond 1 Record 12 File 43

Agreement for collaboration between Bulgarian and Cuban Ministries of the Interior, Source: AMVR, Fond 1, Record 10, File 1214]   
 /Bulgarian Intelligence and Security Services in the Cold War years Cold War Research Group-Bulgaria. Coordinator: Dr. Jordan Baev (2)Handbook of the Comunist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe Institute of National Remembrance, Warszawa, Poland /Bulgaria, Jordan Baev, Kostadin Grozev/

[

Draft!

Top secret!

Only copy

AGREEMENT

For cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Republic Cuba

[…]

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People’s republic of Bulgaria and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Cuba […] agreed upon the following:

Article 1

Both countries will cooperate in the obtaining of political, economic and military information for the USA, Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, China and Albania, NATO, the Vatican, Latin America, about the activities of the USA and NATO in the African countries, for other organizations and military pacts, as well as about the contradictions in and between them and will exchange information on the following issues:

- about the forms and the methods of the activities of the hostile intelligence services and the planned and fulfilled actions and operations implemented by them, about the activities of the Zionist centers, Maoism, emigrant and other reactionary organizations and sects, conducted against the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Republic Cuba and the other socialist countries, about the staff and the agents of these services, centers, units and organizations;

- about different companies, institutions and organizations used by the intelligence of the capitalist countries, which carry out subversive activities against the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Republic Cuba, about the activities of the military attaches and the intelligence agents working from legal positions, about provocative actions against the citizens of against the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Republic Cuba; about data and materials, obtained by .....Translated by Yulia Cherneva]

     

"Havana-Berlin Connection. State Secrets and Notes on the Collaboration between the Stasi and MININT" .Research Blog by Jorge L. García Vázquez                                                                                                                   www.stasi-minint.blogspot.com/

The Kremlin Files: Russian Double Agents and Operational Games

 

The Kremlin Files: Russian Double Agents and Operational Games

 

THE KREMLIN FILES / COLUMN — There are similarities among intelligence agencies worldwide. All professional services rely on tradecraft to recruit and manage assets. They all operate within bureaucratic systems and ultimately answer to political leaders. At a basic level, espionage tradecraft is a common professional language. However, Russian intelligence services (RIS) differ significantly from their Western counterparts in several key aspects. First, their primary mission is not to serve the interests of the Russian people, nor to protect the country's constitution; instead, their loyalty is to the regime and Putin’s personal political survival. And secondly, in terms of tradecraft, they differ from the CIA and other Western services in their approach and tactics. One of the most important—and often misunderstood—aspects of Russian intelligence is their use of double agents, known in Russian intelligence doctrine as operational games (operativnye igry).

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-kremlin-files-russian-double-agents-and-operational-games

By Sean Wiswesser

Former CIA Senior Operations Officer

Sean Wiswesser is a former senior operations officer with the CIA. He served multiple overseas tours and held senior leadership positions such as Chief of Station and in joint-duty assignments across the intelligence community. Sean is the author of the forthcoming book Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War (Spring 2026), which examines the evolution of Russia's intelligence services, their fight against the West, and their role in modern hybrid warfare.

Radiografía de la represión castrista. Control microfónico con el apoyo de la Stasi.

 Jorge L. García Vázquez

 

Ciudad Habana, 1ro de octubre de 1982

Coronel Leben*

"Estimado camarada, permitame hacerle llegar esta carta, para informarle y de paso agradecerle por la gestión realizada en relación a los microfónos,conocimos a través del compañero Antonio(Röster)* que los micrófonos que nos enviaron se lo quitaron de sus reservas,con el    fín de que nosotros pudieramos contar con que enfrentar al enemigo. Este gesto de parte suya lo conceptuamos en alto grado y vemos como se pone de manifiesto una vez más el internacionalismo y la fraternal hermandad entre nuestros dos países.....A Usted le deseamos éxitos en el trabajo futuro y mucha salud en unión de su familia.(sic)

Saludos de camarada

Rodriguez" 

(Texto original del mensaje del MININT a la STASI)

********

"El pasado 26 de mayo del presente los presos políticos más viejos del planeta detectaron casualmente en sus celdas quince diminutos micrófonos instalados en las mismas con el fin de escuchar todas sus conversaciones. Este vergonzoso acto de espionaje político dio lugar a que un enorme dispositivo de miembros del Cuerpo Especial de la P.N.R (Policía Nacional Revolucionaria) a cuyo frente estaban oficiales de la Policía Política de todas las graduaciones, llevaran a cabo una requisa sin precedente alguno en el Presidio Político Cubano. En ella participó un equipo médico integrado por el Dr. Peña, director del Hospital Nacional de Reclusos; la Dra.. María Isabel González Quintana, vice directora del mismo hospital; el Dr. Mier, Dr. Pubillones,  Dra. Lina Paglieny y el Dr. Martínez Noda, entre otros. Los 44 prisioneros plantados fueron llevados al Combinado del Este para ser sometidos a una requisa médica, consistente en hacer un examen físico por la fuerza con el fin de encontrar los micrófonos que se habían tragado como último recurso para conservarlos como prueba de esta violación a los Derechos Humanos. Mario Chanes (moncadista y expedicionario del Granma), Carlos Cabrera, poeta y escritor, y el poeta y escritor Ernesto Díaz Rodríguez, fueron atacados por los guardias, siendo inmovilizados, y los obligaron a ingerir medicamentos de acción catártica y ultra rápida. En el curso de esta maniobra fueron golpeados salvajemente y conducidos al cuarto de rayos X para tomarles por la fuerza placas de todo el cuerpo, también les introdujeron varillas metálicas en todos los orificios del cuerpo. En el caso de Onofre Pérez, que no ha logrado expulsar el micrófono, le dijeron que de no hacerlo sería sometido a una cirugía mayor de abdomen"

Fuente: http://www.sigloxxi.org/Archivo/t-04.htm

*****************

LA HABANA (AP) El disidente Oswaldo Payá denunció el lunes haber encontrado micrófonos en su vivienda y mostró a periodistas pequeños circuitos instalados en el enchufe de su teléfono. 

``Estamos indignados de que este recurso tan bajo se use contra la casa de una familia'', dijo Payá mientras exhibía los aparatos en su hogar.

Ingeniero en telecomunicaciones de profesión, el activista dijo que sospechó ser espiado y desmontó el sábado las dos conexiones de su línea telefónica donde encontró los artefactos, uno de ellos en su dormitorio y otro en el comedor. Payá responsabilizó al gobierno con la complicidad de la empresa italo-cubana ETECSA, la firma mixta con el monopolio en este campo".``Durante muchos años, el estado totalitario en Cuba ha descargado de manera desproporcionada todos sus recursos técnicos y un verdadero ejército de agentes para vigilar, hostigar y reprimir a mi familia'', protestó el opositor."

"Payá dijo que poco después de desmontar los micrófonos, un técnico de ETECSA se presentó a la casa sin haber sido llamado para indicarle que había problemas en la planta y debía revisar los teléfonos. "

El viernes, una esposa de un disidente preso también reportó haber encontrado un aparato similar. 

Se trata de ``una placa de unos 4,5 centímetros de largo y 1,5 de ancho y consta de varios circuitos integrados, algunos de poco más de un milímetro cuadrado'', explicó el disidente.

Payá dijo que también desmanteló micrófonos en la casa de su tía, a 100 metros de la suya y donde a veces recibe invitados. Esta

operación se realizó ante un diplomático extranjero y fue filmada, agregó el opositor.

 http://www.el-mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/1/internacional/2004/12/13/96571/disidente-cubano-encuentra-microfonos-en-su-casa.aspx

Fuente del documento: Archivo de Documentos de la STASI, Berlin

Conexión La Habana-Berlin. Secretos de Estado y Notas sobre la Colaboración  STASI y el MININT.

Mayor General Olaf Leben: jefe del Departamento 26 (vigilancia telefónica). Éste  departmento de la Stasi interceptó mis llamadas telefónicas con funcionarios de la embajada de Estados Unidos en Berlín Oriental ( marzo, 1987), lo que condujo a mi detención (léase secuestro) y mi deportación a Cuba.

Foto: microfóno oculto en la antigua prisión de  Bautzen,RDA.Fuente: Fraunhofer-Institut

The Counterintelligence Analyst, the Stasi, and the Moles. Excerpts from the Havana-Berlin Connection Investigation. By Jorge L. García Vázquez

 

By Jorge L. García Vázquez 

The Bay of Pigs fiasco exposed two fundamental problems. First, it revealed the CIA's operational ineptitude. Second, it highlighted a glaring lack of coordination between the Agency and the White House. These factors, along with the economic strategy of successive US administrations to isolate Cuba through the trade embargo, allowed Fidel Castro to cultivate a robust anti-American movement, gain allies, and secure economic and military support from the socialist bloc.

U.S. intelligence services long underestimated the training, scientific and technical preparation, ideological approach, and methodology of Cuban analysts and officers, including their knowledge of operational psychology. This was demonstrated in 1987 after Major Florentino Aspillaga defected. The CIA carried out multiple operations aimed at weakening the power of the Communist Party and its intelligence apparatus but was unable to erode its foundation. Ultimately, the Agency's analysts failed to grasp their enemy's modus operandi. However, Cuban counterintelligence and espionage do understand the American mindset and work strategy. This has allowed them to create an effective system of influence and operational disinformation.

A parallel can be drawn between the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence and the former East German intelligence services. The operational conditions were analogous, which elucidates the persistent influence of Stasi methodologies on Cuban intelligence analysis and gathering, double agent training, and infiltration plans within the United States.

                                         Havana-Berlin Connection refers to historical ties between Cuba's intelligence services (MININT) and the former East German State Security (Stasi) during the Cold War. East Germany trained Cuban intelligence personnel, exported operational techniques, and provided equipment for surveillance, eavesdropping, illicit communications, and repression. This collaboration helped Cuba develop a comprehensive intelligence and counterintelligence infrastructure, which was applied domestically and internationally.

Jorge Luis García Vázquez's personal experiences with repression—arrest, interrogation, exile—and later scholarly work illuminate both the operational collaboration and the human cost. His documentation underscores how the Stasi system functioned as a blueprint for Cuban intelligence and repression practices.

 

La inteligencia cubana y la CIA: un conflicto en las sombras. Por Henrik Hernandez

 

En el complejo escenario de la guerra de inteligencia, pocos servicios han logrado generar tanto respeto y temor en sus adversarios como la Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) de Cuba. Recientemente, el exjefe de Contrainteligencia de la CIA, James Olson, ha reconocido en distintas entrevistas y publicaciones la impresionante capacidad de los servicios de inteligencia cubanos, calificándolos como "los más irritantes" con los que ha trabajado.

El caso más reciente que ha puesto en evidencia la capacidad de la inteligencia cubana es el de Víctor Manuel Rocha, exembajador de EE.UU. en Bolivia, quien fue arrestado en diciembre de 2023 tras admitir haber trabajado como agente no registrado de Cuba durante más de 40 años. Este incidente, junto con el historial de operaciones encubiertas llevadas a cabo por la DGI, refuerza la imagen de Cuba como un actor clave en la inteligencia global.

                              El reconocimiento de James Olson

James Olson, exdirector de Contrainteligencia de la CIA y actual profesor en la Universidad Texas A&M, ha afirmado en múltiples ocasiones que la inteligencia cubana es una de las más eficaces del mundo....https://tocororocubano.com/la-inteligencia-cubana-y-la-cia-un-conflicto-en-las-sombras/

(The United States is losing the counterintelligence war. Foreign intelligence services, particularly those of China, Russia, and Cuba, are recruiting spies in our midst and stealing our secrets and cutting-edge technologies. In To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, former chief of CIA counterintelligence, offers a wake-up call for the American public and also a guide for how our country can do a better job of protecting its national security and trade secrets. Olson takes the reader into the arcane world of counterintelligence as he lived it during his thirty-year career in the CIA. After an overview of what the Chinese, Russian, and Cuban spy services are doing to the United States, Olson explains the nitty-gritty of the principles and methods of counterintelligence. Readers will learn about specific aspects of counterintelligence such as running double-agent operations and surveillance. The book also analyzes twelve real-world case studies to illustrate why people spy against their country, the tradecraft of counterintelligence, and where counterintelligence breaks down or succeeds. A “lessons learned” section follows each case study.https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/To-Catch-a-Spy  )